Abstract. While recent publications have shown strong relations between impossible differential and zero-correlation distinguishers as well as between zero-correlation and integral distinguishers, we analyze in this paper some relations between the underlying key-recovery attacks against Type-II Feistel networks. The results of this paper are build on the relation presented at ACNS 2013. In particular, using a matrix representation of the round function, we show that we can not only find impossible, integral and multidimensional zero-correlation distinguishers but also find the key-words involved in the underlined key-recovery attacks. Based on this representation, for matrix-method-derived strongly-related zerocorrelation and impossible distinguishers, we show that the key-words involved in the zero-correlation attack is a subset of the key-words involved in the impossible differential attack. Other relations between the key-words involved in zero-correlation, impossible and integral attacks are also extracted. Also we show that in this context the data complexity of the multidimensional zero-correlation attack is larger than that of the other two attacks.
Introduction
Impossible differential (ID) [2, 21] , integral (INT) [22] and multidimensional zerocorrelation (ZC) [11] attacks are efficient attacks for word-oriented block ciphers such as Feistel-like ciphers.
Classically, ID distinguishers take advantage of differentials which never occur for the studied permutations. The security of word-oriented block ciphers is evaluated with respect to this attack. As early as in 2003, based on a matrix representation of the round function, automated methods to find IDs have been proposed [20] .
In ZC cryptanalysis, the attacker rather takes advantage of linear approximations that have probability 1/2 to hold. This relatively new attack, which can be seen as a multidimensional linear attack with capacity equal to zero [10] , has also been applied to many word-oriented block ciphers [12, 10, 9, 27, 32, 31] . The published attacks, which improve upon the state-of-the-art cryptanalysis, can either cover more rounds than the ID attacks, or perform in less time than the ID attacks on the same number of rounds.
In INT attacks, attackers look for particular subsets of chosen plaintexts where some parts of the input are equal to constant whereas the other parts take all possible values. The interesting subsets are the ones such that the sum taken on all the input values after a certain number of rounds is equal to a known value, to another sum or to zero at some particular locations. This attack, also known as saturation or square attack was originally proposed by Knudsen as a dedicated attack against Square [17] .
Recently, mathematical and structural relations between the underling distinguishers have been discussed in the literature. In 2012, Bogdanov et al. [10] showed that the existence of a particular type of integral distinguisher, called zero-correlation integral distinguisher, implies the existence of a zero-correlation distinguisher. Among other relations, in [6, 7] it is shown that in some particular cases, ZC distinguishers and ID distinguishers are mathematically equivalent. While this condition is not often verified in practice, it is shown in [3] that for many Feistel-type ciphers, ID and ZC distinguishers which are build using a matrix method can be derived from each other. The results of [3] are derived from a matrix representation of the cipher [1] and from the fact that ID and ZC distinguishers can be derived from this representation using the so-called U-method [20] . Motivation. In practice, the security regarding these three attacks is often analyzed independently and key-recovery attacks in the ID, ZC and INT contexts are part of different publications. As illustrated in Table 1 usually the number of attacked rounds in all these contexts is similar. When the attacks cover the same number of rounds, it often seems that the relation between these attacks can be seen as a kind of data/time/memory trade-off. While depending of the cipher, different tricks can be used to improve the time and memory complexity of the attacks, we observe that the number of key-words involved in the attack is usually independent of the method used to perform the key-recovery attack. Our Contributions. Relation between ZC and INT distinguishers. From the preliminary link between ZC and integral ZC distinguishers presented in [10] , we derive a general relation between ZC and INT distinguishers. In particular we discuss cases where matrixmethod-derived INT distinguishers cover less or more rounds than matrix-methodderived ZC distinguishers. Relation between the data complexities of ID, ZC and INT attacks. When the distinguishers are matrix-method-related the same number of differential and linear approximations are involved in the attack. In such a case, we can compare the data complexity of ID and ZC. In particular we show that the data complexity of a ZC attack is in that case larger than that of an ID attack. A similar comparison with INT attacks is also studied. Relation between the key-words involved in ID, ZC, and INT attacks. Illustrated by the ID, INT and ZC attacks on LBlock [34] , we show that there exists a strong relation between the key-words involved in the different key-recovery attacks. In particular, we show that when the matrix-method-derived distinguishers are strongly related then the key-words involved in a ZC attack on a Type-II GFN correspond to a subset of the key-words involved in an ID attack. Attack on LBlock. For illustration purposes, we present a ZC attack on 23 rounds of LBlock. The time and memory complexities of this attack are smaller than those of the recent ID attack [14] on this cipher. Outline. Some preliminary notations are defined in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe how the matrix method can be used to find ID, ZC and INT distinguishers on Feistel ciphers and recall the relations between these different distinguishers. In Section 4, we compare the data complexity of these attacks and illustrate on LBlock the strong relation between the key-words involved in the different attacks. In Section 5, we explain how we can use the matrix method to determine the key-words involved in the key-recovery part of the attack. In Section 6, we present an attack on LBlock. Section 7 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries
The structural link between ID and ZC distinguishers described in [3] is relevant for Feistel-like ciphers commonly referred as Generalized Feistel Network (GFN) [28] . More precisely, the round i+1 of a GFN inputs a block X i of n bits divided in b ≥ 2 blocks of c bits each and outputs a block X i+1 . We denote by
the corresponding output blocks. A GFN can be separated into two successive layers, as done in [28, 1] : a non-linear layer and a permutation layer, as shown in Figure 1 . The non-linear layer is made of key-dependent functions F i which input some blocks of size c bits and where the corresponding outputs are added (usually Xor-ed) to some other blocks. The permutation layer is a block-wise permutation of the b blocks denoted by π. For example, for the classical Type-II GFN the permutation is the circular shift.
Xi [2] Xi+1 [2] Xi [4] Xi+1 [4] Xi [6] Xi+1 [6] Xi [1] Xi+1 [1] Xi [3] Xi+1 [3] Xi [5] Xi+1 [5] Xi [7] Xi+1 [7] A generic method that uses a matrix representation and captures the previous definition of GFNs is presented in [1] . This representation could be useful to find ID, ZC and INT distinguishers as well as to show some links between them as began in [3] . Definition 1 sums up this approach for the Type-II GFNs. Definition 1. Omitting key and constant addition, the round function of a Type-II GFN with b branches, b even, can be matricially represented as a combination of two b × b matrices F, P with coefficients {0, 1, F i } where the {F i } i≤b/2 denote the internal non-linear functions.
• Representing the non-linear layer (F-layer), the non-zero coefficients of the matrix F are equal to 1 in the diagonal and have coefficient F i in row j and column if the input of the function F i is given by the -th branch and the output is Xor-ed to the j-th branch. Meaning that, for a Type-II GFN, F have one F i on each even row and even column.
• Representing the permutation of the branches (P-layer), the matrix P is a permutation matrix with only one non-zero coefficient per line and column. From these two matrices, a Type-II GFN round function can be represented by a b × b matrix R as R = P · F, the inverse of the round function is R −1 = F · P −1 .
As observed in [28] , optimal diffusion block permutations have the property that any input block with an even number is mapped to a block with an odd number, and vice versa. A Feistel cipher with this property is called alternating Type-II GFN (AGFN). Some of the results of this paper assume alternating Type-II GFNs. In [27, 3] , another matrix representation is used to find ZC distinguishers on Feistel-like ciphers. The U-method used to find ZC distinguishers relies on the mirror representation of the round function.
Definition 2. For a Feistel-like cipher given the matrix representation of the round function R = P · F, we call mirror function the round function described by the matrix M = P · F T , where F T denotes the transposition of the matrix F.
Distinguishers
The matrix method, which is defined in [20, 35, 27, 24] is used to find respectively ID, INT and ZC distinguishers. For these three attacks, different quantities are involved. For instance, ID distinguishers are derived from an inconsistency between partial differences and ZC distinguishers are derived from an inconsistency between partial linear masks. To show the similarities between ID, ZC and INT attacks, the same notations will be used in the different contexts. These notations are summed up in Table 2 . For instance, for a given a value, the quantity A a denotes respectively a non-zero difference in the ID context, a non-zero mask in the ZC context and symbolizes a permutation of the elements of F c 2 in the INT context. While for type-1 distinguishers (see Definition 3 in Section 3.2)Ã a does not have to be differentiated from A a , such distinction is necessary to find type-2 and type-3 distinguishers. Using these notations, the state of a b-branches GFN can be represented as a vector of b elements of the form given in Table 2 . When necessary, this b-word vector will be denoted by
. For example, in Figure 2 we have :
is computed using the rules given in Table 3 . Table 3 .
The Matrix Method on GFNs
ID Distinguisher. In [20, 24] , the matrix method which allows to efficiently find ID distinguishers for Feistel-type ciphers is described. The algorithm mainly implements the rules given in Table 3 to propagate a partial difference through the rounds of a cipher. The values a and u are arbitrary values starting at 0. As explained in [35] , these indexes allow simplifications of type A a ⊕ A a = 0. Using the matrix representation of the round function, we can derive an ID distinguisher on a GFN. Rules to pass an F function
Rules to pass a ⊕ More details on inconsistencies in the ID and ZC contexts are provided later in this section.
ZC Distinguisher. In [27] , the matrix method to find ZC distinguishers is presented. The main difference with the method used in the ID context comes from the fact that the mirror matrix M (see Definition 2) must be used instead of the round function matrix R. INT Distinguisher. In [35] , the authors proposed an algorithm to automatically find INT distinguishers. The algorithm uses the same rules and the same matrix representation R as in the ID context, only the termination rules differ. For Type-II GFNs, these rules can be expressed as follows. [i] = ⊕ j∈J A j and for
Throughout this paper, we assume that the ID, ZC and INT distinguishers are derived from the matrix method.
Equivalence between Matrix-Method-Derived ID and ZC Distinguishers
In [3] , a condition of equivalence between matrix-method-derived ID and ZC distinguishers is given.
Theorem 1 ([3]
). Let R be the matrix representation of the round function of a GFN and M be the matrix representation of its mirror function as given in Section 2. If there exists a b × b permutation matrix Q such that
we deduce that: an impossible differential distinguisher on r rounds involving a number of differentials equal to M exists if and only if a zero-correlation linear distinguisher on r rounds involving M linear masks exists.
As shown in [3] , most of the Feistel networks verify this condition. In the remainder of this paper, we say that a Feistel-like cipher has matrix-method-derived related ID and ZC distinguishers when the relation is derived from the previous property.
Lemma 1. Given the matrices R = P · F and (1) is fulfilled and P · Q = Q · P we have
Proof. We have P ·F = Q·P ·F T ·Q −1 or equivalently
For the second point, we have P ·F = Q·F T ·P −1 ·Q −1 or equivalently
Remark 1. For a Type-II GFN as given in Definition 1, there always exists a permutation matrix Q such that
While in [13] improved ID distinguishers are presented, using the matrix method for Type-II GFNs we can observe three types of ID and ZC distinguishers [24] .
Following the work of [13, 24] , for a Type-II GFN, we define three types of distinguishers. Let p ∈ {0, · · · , (b − 1)} denote the index of the studied state Y and Y [p] the status of this p-th word.
•An ID (resp. ZC) distinguisher of type-1 denoted by ID1 (resp. ZC1) is a distinguisher with independent input and output differences (resp. masks). For these distinguishers, the inconsistency is usually:
• An ID (resp. ZC) distinguisher of type-2 denoted by ID2 (resp. ZC2) is a distinguisher where a non-zero output-difference word (resp. output-mask word) should be different from an input one. GivenÃ a0 a word of V 0 and W 0 , the inconsistency is:
• An ID (resp. ZC) distinguisher of type-3 is a distinguisher where non-zero input-and output-difference words (resp. output-mask words) should be equal. GivenÃ a0 a word of V 0 and W 0 , we have an ID distinguisher of type-3 (ID3) on s 0 + s 1 + 1 rounds if:
Replacing F by F T in (2) we obtain a ZC distinguisher of type-3 (ZC3).
Clearly, our matrix method captures the distinguishers found using the matrix method described in [24] as in the rules given in Table 3 used to define the transitions of our matrix method, we have: F (Ã i ) = A (maxa)+1 andÃ i ⊕ A j is kept asÃ i ⊕ A j when crossing a xor operation. For example, the ID distinguisher presented in [24] on 16-round of Gen-Skipkack is of type ID2 and the ID distinguisher on 19-round of Gen-CAST256 is of type ID3. The link between ZC and ID distinguishers thus depends of Theorem 1. However, our matrix method does not capture the distinguishers of [13] which depend on differential transition properties of the involved S-boxes.
Comparison with INT Distinguishers
A zero-correlation integral distinguisher is defined in [10] as an integral distinguisher with balanced output words. In Section 3 of [10] a direct relation between zero-correlation integral distinguisher and ZC distinguisher of type-1 is extracted.
As a zero-correlation integral distinguisher is stronger than a general integral distinguisher with sum over an output word equal to zero, we can see that in general, one more round could be added to the zero-correlation integral distinguisher to transform it into an INT distinguisher because if the partial outputs of the zero-correlation integral distinguisher occur equally often, the last linear transformation maps it into an integral distinguisher. More precisely for Type-II GFNs, we deduce that the number of rounds on which an INT distinguisher applies, is greater than or equal to the number of rounds on which a ZC distinguisher of type-1 applies. More precisely for an alternating Type-II GFN, we can show the following lemma. [i] = A j0 and forW From this distinguisher, we obtain
Given that for the ciphers of Definition 1, we have F T = Q · F · Q −1 with Q as in Remark 1, we deduce thatX 
. Now for a Type-II alternating GFN, we can find the different types of impossible differential distinguishers by analyzing the different inconsistency cases betweenX andỸ or a permutation ofỸ .
The Key-Recovery: Notations and Examples
The time and memory complexities of ID, ZC and INT key-recovery attacks are dependent on the number of key-words involved in the attacks. In ID attacks, a distinction is classically made between the key-words which lead to a reduction of the number of pairs and the key-words which are just helping in the partial encryption/decryption without reducing the number of involved pairs ( [14] , Figure 2 ). While the first ones are usually called sieving key-words leading to a so called sieving step, we called guessed key-words the latter ones. The involved key-words corresponds to the sieving key-words and guessed key-words.
Similar concepts can be observed in ZC and INT attacks, where most of the involved key-words lead to a reduction of the size of the table storing the partial distribution. To simplify the description and the comparison, the same terminology will be used in these three contexts. In the ZC and INT contexts, a sieving key-word corresponds to a key-word leading to a reduction of the size of the stored distributions. The number of key-words involved in a key-recovery attack on s + r rounds is denoted by |K|. The number of key-words leading to a sieving step is denoted by |S| and the number of guessed key-words is denoted by |G|. To compute the complexity of a key-recovery attack we denote by HW (V ), the weight of a b-word vector V as
To illustrate this concept, we discuss the examples of ID, ZC and INT attacks on a 4 branches Feistel as well as on LBlock [34] .
Example of Attacks on a 4 Branches Feistel Network
In Figure 3 , we illustrate ID, ZC and INT key-recovery attacks on the last three rounds of a classical type-II GFN with 4 branches. While some of the notations will be defined later, we illustrate the meaning of guessed and sieving key-words in the ID and ZC context by providing some steps of the key-recovery algorithms. For instance some steps of the generic ZC attack on this structure could be: 
ID on 7 rounds
ZC on 7 rounds 
Relation between the Involved Key-Words on LBlock
LBlock is a new lightweight block cipher designed by Wu and Zhang in 2011 [34] . It uses 80-bit keys and 64-bit blocks seen at nibble level and is based on a modified 32-round Feistel structure. We denote by P = L 0 ||R 0 the 64-bit plaintext, where L 0 and R 0 are 32-bit vectors. The encryption process is as follows:
where the F function could be divided into three steps (see Figure 4) . First, the 32-bit subkey K i is added to L i−1 by a simple XOR. Then, a nonlinear layer applies to the result. This nonlinear layer consists of the application nibble by nibble of eight different 4-bit Sboxes S 0 , . . . , S 7 (see [34] for a complete description of the S-boxes). Finally, the resulting nibbles are permuted as shown on Figure 4 . The key-schedule takes as input a master key K seen as a key register denoted at bit level as K = K 79 K 78 · · · K 0 and outputs round-subkeys k i of 32 bits. It repeats the following steps for i = 1 to 31 knowing that k 1 is initialized with the 32 leftmost bits of the key register K:
. k i+1 is selected as the leftmost 32 bits of the key register K.
For this cipher which can be seen, as described in [27] , as a Type-II GFN, ID and ZC distinguishers can be derived from each other [3] and can be applied on 14 rounds [34] . INT distinguishers reach 15 rounds [34] .
Derived from these distinguishers, ID and ZC attacks on 22 rounds [19, 14, 27 ] as well as ID attacks on 23 rounds [14, 15] have been performed. An INT attack on 22 rounds has also been presented [25] . For the illustration purpose of this section, we assume that the round-keys are independent. As the attacks of [19, 14, 27, 25] depend on the key-schedule more details on these attacks will only be presented in Section 6. In this example represented in Figure 5 and in Figure 6 , we observe a strong relation between the key-words involved in the different attacks, when the distinguishers are, what we will call, strongly related (the same key-words are involved in a key-recovery attack on 1 + s + 1 rounds). For this illustration we use as reference the ID attack of [14] derived from the ID distinguisher: For the ZC distinguisher we use: The keys K 5 [3] and K 20 [2] are involved in both attacks, meaning that the chosen ID and ZC distinguishers are strongly related. We also observe that in that case, as for the classical type-II GFN given in Figure 3 , the key-words involved in the ZC attack corresponds to a subset of the key-words involved in the ID attack. We also compare this attack, with an INT attack derived from the following INT distinguisher on 15 rounds: A, A, A, A, A, C, A), (A, A, A, A, A, A, A, A) ) → (( * , * , * , * , * , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , * , * , * , A ⊕ A, * ))].
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Data
Complexity of a Key-Recovery Attack ZC Attack. We denote by M the number of linear approximations which have correlation zero and which are evaluated in the attack. Improving the estimate of [10] , it has been proven in [9] that the data complexity N ZC of a distinct-knownplaintext ZC key-recovery attack is
where z x is obtained from the inverse of the cumulative distribution function Φ of the normal distribution: z x = Φ −1 (x), 1−α corresponds to the success probability of the attack and − log 2 (β) to the advantage of the attack. As the manipulation of the normal distribution makes the comparison between attacks difficult, in the remainder of this paper we use an approximation of it. In particular, we can show (see for instance [29] ) that for β < 2 −5 , z 1−β = Φ −1 (1 − β) ≈ −2 log(β). While an approximation of z 1−α can also be used, in many ZC attacks, the success probability is fixed to 1 − α = 1 − 2 −2.7 ≈ 0.85 such that z 1−α ≈ 1.02. Using this 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 approximation, the data complexity of a ZC key-recovery attack becomes
ID Attack. For most of the attacks in the differential context, the data complexity of an ID key-recovery attack is computed as a function of the structure of the input and output differences but also of the different sieves performed during the attack. In an ID attack, if at least one key remains at the end of the key-recovery part we are certain that the correct key is among them. In statistical terms [4] , this particularity means that the success probability 1 − α of the attack is equal to 1. Given structures of size 2 t and given 2 m structures used in an ID attack, the data complexity is N ID = 2 m+t . In the ID cryptanalysis context [2, 15] , it is commonly assumed that the false alarm probability, denoted β in this paper is determined by β = (1 − 2 −q )
m+2t−p−q−1 , where 2 −p corresponds to the product probabilities discarding plaintext-pairs and 2 q corresponds to the probability of discarding a key. Thus, we have
When the data complexity is smaller than the maximal size of a structure or if the ID attack can be done in the known plaintext model, we have N ID = 2 p+q−1 log(1/β). If we have M differentials involved in our ID distinguisher, we can show that 2 p+q+n−t = 2 2n /M , where n is the size of the encrypted blocks. In the case where more than one structure is used, we have
From a direct comparison between (4) and (6) we deduce that:
Lemma 3. Given two related ID and ZC distinguishers, involving M differentials or linear approximations, if the success probability of the ZC attack is 50% (z 1−α = 0), we have N ID ≤ N ZC as long as log(1/β) ≤ M . This relation remains true, for larger success probabilities since the data complexity of the ZC attack will, in that case, be larger too. 
Remark 4. For many Feistel-like ciphers, the number M of differences involved in an ID distinguisher of type-1, is M = 2 2·c (see examples in [24] ) and the weight v of V ) and
) and given a success probability 1 − α of 50% in the ZC context, we obtain that N IN T /N ZC1 ≈ 2 log(1/β). Thus, the data complexity of an INT attack is greater than the one of a ZC1 attack. For larger success probability, this is no more true and in general
After the analysis of the data complexities, some questions arise. In particular we could wonder what is the benefit of a ZC attack if its data complexity is larger than the one of an INT or ID attack. In the next section, using a matrix representation of the round function, we study the relation between the key-words involved in the different attacks and show that for matrix-method-derived related distinguishers the number of key-words involved in a ZC key-recovery attack is smaller than the number of key-words involved in a ID attack on the same number of rounds.
Key-Words Involved in a Key-Recovery Attack
From a matrix representation of Type-II GFN ciphers, we analyze in this section the key-recovery part of these attacks. This analysis is done for related and strongly related matrix-method-derived ID, ZC and INT distinguishers. We say that the ZC and INT distinguishers are strongly related if the same keywords are involved in a key-recovery attack over one round of partial decryption. In this section, strongly related INT and ZC distinguishers do not necessary apply on the same number of rounds. We say that the ZC and ID distinguishers are strongly related if the same keywords are involved in a key-recovery attack over one round of partial encryption and one round of partial decryption. For instance, for the Nyberg constructions, the matrix-method derived ID and ZC distinguishers are related but are not strongly related. This can be proven by observing that for this non-alternating cipher, P · Q = Q · P for Q defined as in Remark 1. But, for this cipher, the distinguishers are related in the sense of Theorem 1.
A Matrix Representation for Analyzing Key-Recovery Attacks
In the same way, we can derive ID, ZC and INT distinguishers of a Feistel cipher using a matrix representation of the round function, we show in this section how we can find the key-words involved in the attack using a matrix method. In this section, the vectors V 0 and W 0 represent respectively the input and output of the distinguishers. The vectors V i and W j represent the state when i ≤ r in rounds are added at the beginning of a distinguisher and j ≤ r out rounds are added at the end of this distinguisher. The knowledge of the value of the vectors {V i } i<rin and {W j } j<rout will be necessary to compute the number of attacked rounds in the ID, ZC and INT contexts. The operations on these vectors correspond to those given in Section 2.
In that case, the vectors V i , W j ∈ {(0,Ã a , A a , val)} b where A i ,Ã i denote a difference-word or a state-word which has to be computed and 0 denote words with no difference or a state-word with value unnecessary for the attack. We use the following arithmetic similar to the one given in Table 2 : 0 ⊕ A a = A a , A a ⊕ A a = A a , F (0) = 0 and F (A a ) = A a . The description of val is given later in this section and is only used in the ID context. As explained in Section 3, the notationÃ a is necessary for the type-2 and type-3 ID and ZC distinguishers, which hold when the input and output differences (masks) should be respectively strictly different or strictly equal.
In an INT attack, using the partial sum technique introduced in [26] and described in Figure 7 , the key-recovery attack could be divided in two searching paths reducing the overall time complexity. The computational time required by the second path is marginal as it usually allows to gain at least one round for free. More sophisticated attacks such as meet in the middle attacks could be mount using INT distinguishers (see for example [23] ). For comparison purposes, we do not integrate those tricks in our study of the key-words involved in the attack. In all the cases, considering only the primary branch of the partial sum technique, we show that the number of involved key-words in the INT context is always lower than the number of key-words involved in the ZC context and in the ID context considering only the r out direction.
Moreover, as all the INT distinguishers obtained using the matrix method are in fact higher order integral distinguishers with b − 1 or b − 2 active words in input, the computational cost to pay when trying to add one round at the beginning of this distinguisher is really high (except when some particular tricks such as the ones described in [18] could be considered which is not always the case) and to stay as generic as possible, we only consider a key-recovery attack on r out rounds at the end of the INT distinguisher.
On the left, the test to perform without the partial sum. On the right, the test to perform with the partial sum divides the computations into two steps.
Illustrated by the example provided in Figure 3 , the sieving and guessed key-words can be found as follows. • The key-word
• The number of active words corresponds to the weight of V i .
-Given the vector W j−1 .
• The key-word
• The number of active words corresponds to the weight of W j .
Proof. The proof of the first point is illustrated in Figure 8 . In the left figure, the notation V i [2p] = A i means that the value of V i [2p] = A i should be known to be able to compute V A [2p + 1]. After partial encryption the value of V A [2p] is not needed in the remainder of the key-recovery. The second part of the lemma is illustrated by the example provided in Figure 3 .
Sieving key:
Guessed key: Usually in the ID context the matrix method allows us to only study the propagation of the differences. However, in the partial encryption/decryption process there are cases where even if the difference is equal to 0, the knowledge of the value is necessary to complete the key-recovery. We introduce the notation val , to represent such a word with difference 0. The weight of a vector V corresponds to the number of non-zero differences. • The vector V i is computed as
• The number of active words corresponds to the weight of F · V A .
• The key-word to val.
• The vector W j is computed as W j = P · F · W j−1 .
• The number of active words corresponds to the weight of P · F · W j−1 .
Proof. The proof is similar to the one in the ZC case but the reasoning is done with differentials instead of with the state-values. The difficult case corresponds to the third point. Indeed, when V A [2p + 1] = 0 and V A [2p] = 0, it means that the value V A [2p] needs to be known even if the difference is 0 and thus for that purpose, we decide to use the val notation.
Lemma 6. In the INT context, only the output direction on r out rounds is considered. Given the distinguisher (V 
Relations between the Key-Words of the Different Attacks
From the rules expressed in the previous section, we can derive the following relations between the key-words involved in the different attacks for related and strongly related matrix-method-derived distinguishers.
Lemma 7. For a Type-II GFN, given a matrix-method-derived ZC distinguisher and its strongly related ID distinguisher, the key-words involved in a ZC keyrecovery attack is a subset of the key-words involved in an ID key-recovery attack. The number of sieving key-words is identical.
Proof. In this proof, we define the matrix Q such that F T = Q · F · Q −1 (see Remark 1). According to the hypothesis made in the beginning of this section in order to have the same key-words involved in an attack on 1+1 rounds, the vectors V Lemma 8. For Type-II GFNs fulfilling one of the conditions given in Theorem 1 and for related ZC and ID distinguishers, the key-words involved in the encryption (resp. decryption) side of the ZC attack correspond to a subset of the key-words involved in the encryption (resp. decryption) side of the ID attack.
Proof. As the cipher is alternating, according to the rules given in Lemma 4, we have |{p|W 
A ZC Attack on LBlock
In Section 4 we show a relation between the key-words involved in a key-recovery attack on LBlock. In this section we present a ZC attack on 23 rounds of this cipher when taking into consideration the key-schedule of this cipher.
In the INT attack of [25] , 69 key-bits are involved and among them, 55 are sieving key-bits. The ZC attack of [27] requires to guess 2 4·14 = 2 56 keys. Complexities of the best attacks on LBlock are resumed in Table 1 . In the analysis provided in [14] , using a different ID distinguisher leads to only guess 71 key-bits in the attack on 22 rounds. A similar analysis shows that only 2 extra bits need to be guessed in the attack on 23 rounds. As done in [14] and [25] in the ID and INT context, from an analysis of the key-schedule we can derive a ZC attack on 23 rounds of LBlock.
The different steps of the attack are given below. Table 5 sums up the subkeys involved in the attack and the corresponding bits of the master key as described in Figure 6 whereas [6] to it ("Get" column). Table 5 : The keys involved in our attack on 23 rounds of LBlock and their dependency to the master key. See [34] for more details. The notation f ({i − j}) means dependent of the keys bit i to j of the master key.
Step Given a set of 2 4+4 linear masks, the time complexity of the distillation phase of the attack is N · 2 17 · 1/23 · 5/8 + 2 75.83 where the data complexity N is determined by the advantage of the attack for a success probability of 85%.
In the recent ID attack on LBlock [14] different data and time trade-offs are suggested. For a complete comparison, we suggest here also different trade-offs depending of the advantage obtained in the distillation phase of the attack but also using smaller multidimensional linear spaces.
Instead of taking advantage of the ZC approximation Table 6 without knowing the b 1 most significant bits of R 0 [3] . In the same way, b 2 bits of R 23 [3] do not need to be stored. In this case, the size of the involved tables are divided by 2 b1+b2 and the time complexity of the Steps 2 to 14 of Table 6 are divided by 2 b1+b2 . Table 7 gives an alternative attack when M = 2 4 . The memory complexity is larger (2 60 instead of 2 56 ) than with the previous method, nevertheless the time complexity is smaller.
Step In Table 8 , we provide the complexity for a number M of linear approximations between 2 4 and 2 8 .The results show that even if the key-dependency is stronger in the ID context we can also take advantage of this key-dependency in a ZC attack to obtain an attack with a better time complexity. Due to the use of tricks to reduce the time complexity, the memory complexity of the ID attack of [14] is larger than the one of the ZC attack.
ID on 23 rounds from [14] Data Time Memory 2
Conclusion
In this paper, we show how we can use the matrix method to analyse the keyrecovery of Feistel-like ciphers. Based on a matrix representation of the round function we determine the key-words involved in ID, ZC or INT key-recovery attacks. In particular we illustate, that in many cases, when the matrix-methodderived distinguishers are related the number of involved key-words is smaller in the ZC and INT context than in the ID context. Nevertheless, our analysis also show that when the same number of differential and linear approximations are used, the data complexity of a ZC attack is larger than the one of a related ID attack.
While most of the results of this paper are dedicated to Type-II GFN, similar results can be obtained for other ciphers. For example, ID and ZC attacks behave similarly against the Feistel-like ciphers, HIGHT [16, 32] and SIMON [30] (see Table 1 ) which contain modular additions, AND and rotation operations. Whereas the INT distinguisher is less efficient for HIGHT than ZC and ID distinguishers, it is more efficient, at bit level, in the case of SIMON.
